

WHY DO MANAGERS ACT FAIRLY IN THE FIRST PLACE? A DAILY INVESTIGATION OF “HOT” AND “COLD” MOTIVES AND DISCRETION

BRENT A. SCOTT
ADELA S. GARZA
DONALD E. CONLON
Michigan State University

YOU JIN KIM
California State University

Although considerable research has focused on employee reactions to organizational justice, far less research has examined why managers adhere to rules of justice in the first place. Taking a proactive approach to organizational justice, we address this void by examining managerial motives for adhering to distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal rules of justice on a day-to-day basis. Results of an experience-sampling study of 90 managers who completed daily surveys over a three-week period revealed that both “cold” cognitive (i.e., effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness) and “hot” affective (i.e., high positive affect and low negative affect) motives were associated with managerial adherence to justice rules. Moreover, “cold” motives were more strongly associated with justice rule adherence for justice dimensions over which managers perceived less discretion, while “hot” motives were more strongly associated with justice rule adherence for justice dimensions over which managers perceived greater discretion. We discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.

For decades, research on organizational justice has illuminated what it means to be treated fairly versus unfairly in the workplace (for a historical overview, see Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005). This research has shown that employees are capable of distinguishing between four basic dimensions of justice—distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal—and that each dimension of justice is fostered when managers adhere to various “rules.” *Distributive justice* captures the fairness of decision outcomes and is fostered when managers adhere to accepted rules of allocation, such as equity (Adams, 1965). *Procedural justice* captures the fairness of decision-making processes and is fostered when managers adhere to rules such as granting voice to employees, as well as consistency, accuracy, correctness, bias suppression, ethicality, and representativeness (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). *Informational justice* captures the fairness of communication and is fostered when managers adhere to rules of truthfulness and justification (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993). Finally, *interpersonal justice* captures the fairness of interactions

and is fostered when managers adhere to rules of dignity and respect (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993).

Literally hundreds of studies have demonstrated the importance of fairness to the workplace by showing that managers’ adherence to (versus violation of) the rules relevant to each justice dimension is associated with critical employee attitudes (e.g., increased job satisfaction and organizational commitment), feelings (e.g., positive moods), and behaviors (e.g., higher task performance and organizational citizenship behavior, and lower counterproductive work behavior) (for a recent meta-analysis, see Colquitt et al., 2013). Such studies—which take a reactive approach, assessing the responses of employees to situations of fairness and unfairness—have dominated the justice literature (Colquitt, 2012).

Far less research has taken a proactive approach, seeking to identify factors that foster justice rule adherence and to “explain why individuals strive to create just states” (Colquitt, 2012: 33; see also Greenberg, 1987). As Colquitt (2012) noted in his recent review of the justice literature, a conse-

quence of a one-sided focus on employee reactions to justice is that we know very little about why the various rules of justice are adhered to or violated by managers in the first place. Shifting the spotlight from employees to managers, however, is critical, because understanding the emergence of just actions requires that we first understand the reasons, or motives, behind those actions. On this point, the scientific literatures on other work phenomena, such as prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Dion, 2003) and organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Grant & Mayer, 2009), have benefited from a focus on actors and their motives. Indeed, Dion (2003) noted that actor-focused research on prejudice and discrimination has outweighed victim-focused research, because if the psychology of actors were to be understood, then scientifically based remedial efforts could be devised to reduce the occurrence of such harmful actions.

With the above in mind, the goal of our study is to advance the literature on proactive, actor-focused approaches to organizational justice. Using a recently proposed theoretical model of managerial behavior as our starting point, we first examine the relationships between both cognitive and affective motives and justice rule adherence. We next consider the relative importance of cognitive and affective motives as they relate to each form of justice. As we go on to hypothesize, the relative importance of cognition versus affect in motivating justice rule adherence is likely to vary according to the type of justice involved, with cognitive motives driving rule adherence more for those justice dimensions that afford managers less discretion, or freedom, in their execution, while affective motives drive rule adherence more for those justice dimensions that afford managers greater discretion in the execution. Overall, by taking a more theoretically nuanced look at the interplay of managerial motives and discretion, and shedding light not only on what motives are associated with a given type of justice rule adherence, but also on when those motives are more or less important, we better reveal the psychology of the actor.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

To date, only a handful of studies have taken a proactive, actor-focused approach, examining managerial factors as antecedents of justice rule adherence. Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, and Goldstein (2007) found that neurotic managers were less likely to adhere to interpersonal justice and agreeable

managers were more likely to adhere to informational justice, while Patient and Skarlicki (2010) reported that both of these forms of justice are adhered to more by empathic managers. In addition, Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, and Van Hiel (2011) linked managers' moral identity to greater procedural justice rule adherence. Finally, Blader and Chen (2012) linked high status and low power to greater procedural and distributive justice rule adherence.

Although these studies suggest that there is value in taking a proactive approach to the study of organizational justice, two issues are worth noting. First, compared to knowledge on reactions to justice, knowledge on the precursors of justice rule adherence has developed more slowly. In part, this may result from a lack of theoretical frameworks to guide the selection of predictors, resulting in studies examining only one or two predictors and/or a subset of the justice dimensions. This stands in sharp contrast to research on reactions to justice, the growth of which has been facilitated by frameworks such as social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001), uncertainty management theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002), and the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003).

Second, the existing work taking a proactive approach has concentrated on relatively stable characteristics emanating from managers' dispositions (e.g., personality, moral identity) or their social positions (e.g., status, power) to explain *between-manager* variation in justice rule adherence. Although focusing on whether (and why) some managers are fairer than others in general is important, that focus ignores the possibility that a given manager varies in his or her justice rule adherence from one point in time to the next. Indeed, it may be the case that justice rule adherence is more of a *within-manager* phenomenon than a between-manager phenomenon, with rule adherence driven primarily by transitory motives operating at a given time.

A recently introduced model in the justice literature may help to clarify these issues. The actor-focused model of justice rule adherence developed by Scott, Colquitt, and Paddock (2009) is a conceptual framework that focuses specifically on actors (i.e., managers) and their motives. According to the model, both "cold" cognitive and "hot" affective motives drive managers' adherence to justice rules. On the cognitive side, managers adhere to justice rules out of desires to effect compliance in their subordinates, to create and maintain desired identities, and simply to establish fairness. On the affective side,

managers adhere to justice rules when they experience more positive and less negative affect. Importantly, the actor-focused model also proposes that the justice dimensions vary in terms of the amount of discretion they afford to managers, with managers having the least amount of control over distributive justice rule adherence, followed in turn by procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice.

As a result of its focus on motives, especially those that are affective and thus transitory, the actor-focused model is well suited to explain *why* a given manager adheres to rules of justice at some times, but not at others. In addition, although not posited by the model, the notion of managerial discretion is well suited to explain *when* a given type of motive (cognitive versus affective) is more or less important in explaining these within-manager fluctuations in justice rule adherence. Therefore, as we elaborate next, the synthesis of motives and discretion has the potential to answer the question “How can fair conditions be created?” (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001: 272) by illuminating the specific circumstances that pave the way for justice rule adherence.

Managerial Motives for Justice Rule Adherence

The identification of motives, or the driving forces behind a given action (Simon, 1964), has helped organizational scholars to better understand a variety of workplace phenomena, including employee citizenship behavior (e.g., Grant & Mayer, 2009) and intentions to remain in the organization (Bagozzi, Bergami, & Leone, 2003). Drawing from the social psychological literature on aggression (e.g., Tedeschi & Felson, 1994), the actor-focused model proposes both “cold” motives for justice rule adherence that are more cognitive and premeditated, as well as “hot” motives that are more affective and impulsive (Scott et al., 2009).

Cognitive motives. On the cognitive side, the actor-focused model proposes that managers are motivated to adhere to distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal rules of justice for three primary reasons: to effect compliance in subordinates, to create and maintain desired identities, and to maintain a just world via the establishment of fairness.

Effecting compliance refers to a manager’s desire to control and influence his or her employees’ behaviors (Scott et al., 2009). Managers may utilize justice rule adherence as a resource in social exchange relationships with subordinates (see Blau, 1964), in an attempt to elicit desired outcomes such

as positive attitudes, increased motivation, and higher performance. Indeed, research has found that each of these outcomes is associated with subordinates’ perceptions of fair treatment (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013). Subordinates may respond in favorable ways to adhere to the norm of reciprocity, which guides social exchange relationships and stipulates that individuals should return benefits to those from whom they have received benefits (Gouldner, 1960). Importantly, research on allocation decisions suggests that managers recognize that adherence to justice rules such as equity may elicit desired behavior (e.g., performance) in their subordinates, at least for distributive justice (e.g., Meindl, 1989). Moreover, recent work suggests that managerial control and fairness are intertwined: When control systems and fairness perceptions are aligned, subordinates are more likely to comply with managerial directives because they form a “more coherent, internally consistent picture” of the organization (Long, Bendersky, & Morrill, 2011: 1046).

Identity maintenance refers to a manager’s desire to create or maintain a particular social identity, to influence the way in which he or she is perceived by subordinates. Although much research has focused on subordinates’ efforts to manage how they are viewed by their managers, managers are also motivated to shape how they are viewed by their employees (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008). Research suggests that managers are aware that actions such as recognizing employees’ accomplishments, providing employees with voice, and explaining procedures to employees, all of which adhere to various rules of justice, can aid in the cultivation of a positive image (Greenberg, 1988). The notion that justice rule adherence may be used for impression management purposes is indirectly supported by research on organizational citizenship behavior, which has shown that employees engage in positive behaviors such as helping in order to enhance their own images (e.g., Grant & Mayer, 2009).

Both of the above motives (effecting compliance and identity maintenance) suggest that managers use justice rule adherence instrumentally to achieve some distal, self-interested outcome. Yet justice rule adherence may be an outcome in its own right, as managers strive to maintain their own standards of fairness. *Establishing fairness* captures this notion and refers to a manager’s desire to keep the scales of justice in balance as a way in which to maintain a sense of fairness (Scott et al., 2009). As Meindl (1989: 272) noted in his study on resource allocation decisions: “The distribution of resources

is a matter of distributive justice and fairness not only for the subordinate recipients . . . but also for the managers and supervisors.” Meindl’s findings fit well with the notion of a justice motive, put forth by Lerner decades ago (for a review, see Lerner, 2003). Lerner argued that people are capable of moral, systematic reasoning, and that their behavior is not always guided by self-interest; instead, people’s actions may be motivated by desires to ensure that others get what they deserve and deserve what they get. Thus managers may adhere to rules of justice out of a simple desire to establish norms of fairness.

Hypothesis 1. Managers are more likely to adhere to rules of justice (distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal) when they are motivated to (a) effect compliance in subordinates, (b) create and maintain a desired identity, and/or (c) establish a sense of fairness.

Affective motives. In addition to the three cognitive motives discussed above, the actor-focused model proposes that justice rule adherence may also be driven by “hot” affective states (i.e., short-term moods or emotions). This affective approach to justice rule adherence acknowledges that, in some cases, fulfilling rules of justice via means such as adhering to equity, providing an employee with voice, sharing information, or treating an employee with respect may not always result from a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of engaging in such actions. Instead, justice rule adherence may arise in a more spontaneous fashion as affective states take what is referred to as “control precedence,” meaning that they occupy center stage relative to other concerns by dominating attention and behavior (Frijda, 2007).

Drawing on the distinction in the literature between positive and negative affect (Watson, 2000), the actor-focused model proposes that positive affective states should make it more likely that managers will adhere to rules of justice, while negative affective states should make it less likely. Positive affective states tend to trigger prosocial states of action readiness such as cooperation, information sharing, and kindness (Isen, 2000), all of which have ties to the rules of justice. In contrast, negative affective states (especially states such as anger, frustration, and hostility) tend to trigger antisocial states of action readiness such as biased discrimination and aggressiveness (e.g., Tedeschi & Felson, 1994), which also have ties to rules of jus-

tice. Managers may express their negative affective states not only because they have greater power and status relative to subordinates (Fitness, 2000), but also because they may believe that doing so will serve as a form of catharsis, reducing the aversive feelings (Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001).

Hypothesis 2. Managers are more likely to adhere to rules of justice (distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal) when they experience (a) high positive affect and/or (b) low negative affect.

Integration of Managerial Discretion and Motives

Beyond hypothesizing that managerial adherence to justice rules is driven by both cognitive and affective motives, we are interested in the relative importance of the two sets of motives across the four justice dimensions. Indeed, the actor-focused model is silent on the relative importance of each type of motive. On the one hand, it may be that justice rule adherence is driven more by “cold” cognitive motives, because, as boundedly rational actors, managers are expected to make calculated decisions within the confines of the organization’s routines and standard operating procedures (March & Simon, 1958). On the other hand, it may be that justice rule adherence is driven more by “hot” affective motives, because emotions may override existing concerns, prioritizing behavior and resulting in impulsive action (Elfenbein, 2007; Frijda, 2007). We suggest that the importance of the motives differs from one justice dimension to the next and that such differences stem from a key underlying (and as yet untested) tenet of the actor-focused model: the level of discretion that managers possess over each justice dimension.

“Discretion,” which refers to a managers’ latitude or freedom over his or her actions (Shen & Cho, 2005), is a notion that has been discussed by organizational scholars for decades. Perspectives on managerial discretion share the idea that managers may be constrained by external factors, restricting the amount of influence that they have over their own behaviors and decisions (Shen & Cho, 2005). Of most relevance to our study, Finkelstein and Peteraf (2007) suggested that intrinsic characteristics of activities themselves provide managers with more or less discretion. Here, we conceptualize *discretion* as the perceived control that managers have over adherence to the rules of organizational justice.

Similarly to Finkelstein and Peteraf (2007), Scott et al. (2009) argued that intrinsic characteristics of the four justice dimensions afford managers varying degrees of latitude in their execution. Specifically, Scott et al.'s actor-focused model identifies four factors in terms of which the justice dimensions differ that should influence managers' perceptions of discretion. One factor is the degree to which the justice dimensions are "systemic," which captures the notion that some dimensions are governed more by formal organizational practices and protocols than are others (see Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). A second factor is "cost," which captures the idea that some justice dimensions require the distribution of potentially expensive resources relative to others. A third factor is the extent to which the justice dimensions are "collectively observable," which captures the view that some dimensions are adhered to more conspicuously than others. A final factor is the extent to which the justice dimensions are "exchange-based" versus "encounter-based," which captures the notion that some dimensions are relevant only to specific decision-making or allocation contexts, while other dimensions are relevant to general interactions (see Bies, 2005).

Distributive justice rule adherence is likely to be constrained by several of these factors. For example, the allocation of resources and rewards is often governed by systemic, structural practices (human resource management systems, policies, and formalized contracts) limiting the discretionary options available to managers (Sheppard et al., 1992). Additionally, distributive justice tends to occur primarily in more formal exchange contexts, defined by Bies (2005: 101) as "specific organizational decisions or resource allocations," further limiting managers' opportunities to impact on this form of justice. Finally, the allocation of such outcomes is likely to be more conspicuous given that pay and benefits are long-lasting.

Compared to distributive justice, managers should have more discretion over procedural justice. Although, like distributive justice, procedural justice may be structural and organization-originating, guided by formal policies, and implemented in more formal exchange contexts (Bies, 2005), it may also be supervisor-originating (i.e., informal and idiosyncratic), as noted by the multi-foci view of justice (Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). In turn, this affords managers greater latitude over procedural justice rules.

Interactional justice forms (i.e., informational and interpersonal) should provide managers with

the most discretion. Both of these justice types are relatively cost-free and are less constrained by systemic forces—that is, the provision of explanations is less governed by organizational protocols than are distributive or procedural justice rules, and this is even more true of the provision of politeness toward or respect for employees. In addition, although both informational and interpersonal justice were initially theorized as occurring in the context of formalized exchanges and decisions (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993), contemporary theorizing has reconceptualized these forms of justice as also relevant to everyday, informal encounters between managers and subordinates. As Bies (2005: 97) noted, "information sharing about organizational matters—that is, just keeping people 'informed'—is often viewed by people as a fairness issue." Bies (2005) also noted that interpersonal justice concerns should not be limited to specific decision-making or allocation contexts. Thus, in contrast to distributive and procedural justice, adherence to informational and interpersonal justice is often much more informal and exists beyond specific allocation decisions. Finally, interactional forms of justice are also less conspicuous in the sense that many supervisor-subordinate interactions involve dyadic communication rather than large-scale communication between a manager and an entire work unit. We therefore test an underlying assumption in the actor-focused model (Scott et al., 2009) that managers perceive differences in the degree to which they have control over the rules governing the four dimensions of justice in the following progression:

Hypothesis 3. Managerial perceptions of discretion over justice-relevant actions increase as one moves from distributive to procedural to informational to interpersonal justice.

Using the actor-focused model as an overarching framework, we next consider the interplay of motives and discretion, and submit that conditions impeding versus those facilitating discretion also affect the extent to which cognitive versus affective motives predominate in explaining justice rule adherence. Specifically, as actions become more or less (a) influenced by systemic, bureaucratic elements, (b) costly, (c) conspicuous, and (d) exchanged-based, cognition (affect) will become a stronger driver of behavior. By extension, cognitive motives will be more predictive of justice dimensions affording managers less discretion (i.e., procedural and—especially—distributive justice),

while affective motives will be more predictive of justice dimensions affording managers more discretion (i.e., informational and—especially—interpersonal justice).

In terms of systemic constraints, formalized organizational policies and protocols governing managerial actions frequently serve as buffers against emotions, encouraging managers to be more cognitive and “rational” in their actions (see Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). On this point, Elfenbein (2007: 334) noted, “bureaucracy developed at least partly to limit individuals’ abilities to act upon their emotions.” In terms of cost, considerable work in consumer behavior highlights that as costs increase, decisions and behaviors are driven more by deliberate, cognitive processes and less by impulsive, emotional processes, while the opposite is true as costs decrease (e.g., Rook & Gardner, 1993; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006). In terms of conspicuousness, when individuals know that others will scrutinize their decisions, decisions and behaviors are made in a more deliberate, careful (and less emotional) manner (Tetlock, 1999). Finally, in terms of the distinction between “exchanges,” which are more formal, and “encounters,” which are more informal (Blader & Tyler, 2003), work on moral judgment suggests that impersonal situations elicit more cognitively based decisions and behaviors, while more informal situations involving greater personal contact elicit more emotionally based decisions and behaviors (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Thus each factor that the actor-focused model proposes will restrict managerial discretion (the presence of systemic factors, higher costs, greater conspicuousness, and formal exchanges) has been shown to be associated with more reasoned, cognitive processes, while each factor that the model proposes will facilitate discretion (the absence of systemic factors, lower costs, lesser conspicuousness, and informal encounters) has been shown to be associated with more impulsive, emotional processes.

From a more holistic perspective, a common thread running through these factors is the level of difficulty inherent in rule adherence opportunities. Managers are motivated to control their environment and to implement their preferences (Mechanic, 1962); however, to do so, they must often work “within the parameters of the organization’s rule and processes” (Blader & Tyler, 2003: 118). Accordingly, navigating through discretion-reducing factors such as “red tape” and formalities, greater costs, and public scrutiny should be more

difficult and cognitively demanding, requiring the synthesis of multiple, diverse, and potentially conflicting elements (see Campbell, 1988). High-discretion situations, in which managers have fewer confines through which to navigate, should be easier, allowing managers to rely on their current feelings as a simple heuristic for how to act (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). On this point, work in neuroscience (e.g., Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) has shown that when judgments are separated into “difficult” and “easy” categories, greater cognitive activity (as represented by increased prefrontal cortex activity), as opposed to emotional activity (e.g., activity in the limbic system), is found for difficult judgments, while the obverse is true for easy judgments.

As an example, consider the challenges involved in allocating outcomes to an employee from a raise pool during a formal exchange (distributive justice) versus treating an employee respectfully during a more informal encounter (interpersonal justice). Whereas allocating the raise has tangible cost, is likely to have longer-lasting, public implications, and comes from a fixed and limited resource, behaving respectfully is nearly cost-free, can be done more fleetingly and privately, and is a resource that does not decrease as it is distributed (Foa & Foa, 1975; McLean Parks, Conlon, Ang & Bontempo, 1999). The distributive justice situation thus involves the consideration of a greater number of elements, making it a more difficult endeavor compared to the interpersonal justice situation. As a result, adhering to distributive justice should require more deliberate, cognitively driven behavior, while adhering to interpersonal justice should allow for more impulsive, affect-driven behavior.

Overall, the above suggests that implementing managerial preferences with regard to justice is a more difficult endeavor with low-discretion forms of justice and thus should be based on a more cognitive, rational approach. In contrast, adhering to or violating high-discretion forms of justice is a simpler endeavor, allowing the manager’s current affective state to drive behavior. In such cases, where fewer constraints are present and managers have greater latitude over how to act, the current affective states experienced by the manager are likely to unveil the “essential feature” of those states—namely, control precedence (Frijda, 2007: 16)—thereby taking center stage relative to cognitive motives. Thus the integration of the actor-focused model’s distinction between cognitive and affective motives, with its proposed factors creating differences in managerial dis-

cretion across the four dimensions of justice, suggests that dimensions of justice affording managers lower levels of discretion will be explained more by cognitive motives, while dimensions of justice affording managers higher levels of discretion will be explained more by affective motives.

Hypothesis 4. As one moves from distributive to procedural to informational to interpersonal rules of justice, cognitive motives (effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness) become weaker predictors of (i.e., explain less variance in) justice rule adherence, while affective motives become stronger predictors of (i.e., explain more variance in) justice rule adherence.

PILOT STUDY

The purpose of our pilot study was to construct multi-item measures of the five motives for justice rule adherence specified in the actor-focused model. To generate items, we drew on the discussion in Scott et al. (2009) of each motive and, when applicable, reviewed existing measures of constructs sharing similarities with a given motive—e.g., belief in a “just world” scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) for the establishing fairness motive, and the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) for the positive and negative affect motives. For guidance, we also examined recent studies of motives for citizenship behavior (e.g., Grant & Mayer, 2009). This process resulted in an initial pool of 11 *effecting compliance* items, 18 *identity maintenance* items, 15 *establishing fairness* items, five *positive affect* items, and five *negative affect* items.

Sample and Procedure

We pilot tested our items on a sample of 83 managers recruited from StudyResponse (Stanton & Weiss, 2002), an academic service that facilitates online research by distributing e-mail participation requests to adult research participants. Participation was limited to individuals in supervisory positions working at least 30 hours per week. A total of 117 requests were distributed, resulting in a response rate of 70.9%. The 83 participants had worked an average of 9.8 years ($SD = 7.2$). In exchange for participating, individuals received US\$20.

After reading an informed consent, participants completed an online survey. Managers were first asked to recall an instance in which they fulfilled a

justice-relevant rule (i.e., allocating an outcome to a subordinate that was justified based on that subordinate’s effort, allowing a subordinate to have voice in a decision, providing a subordinate with an honest explanation about a decision, or treating a subordinate with dignity and respect). With that instance in mind, managers were asked to indicate the extent to which each item capturing a given motive provided a reason for their behavior, with scale anchors ranging from 1 (*to a very little extent*) to 5 (*to a very large extent*). Although the use of self-reports to study motives has been debated, we chose to ask managers to report on their own motives for two specific reasons: First, as Locke and Latham (2004) argued, insight into an individual’s motives for engaging in a given behavior is best uncovered through introspection; second, the actor-focused model is so named because of its exclusive focus on the actor, hence we found it most appropriate to survey managers directly.

Because our goal was to reduce the number of items in each scale to a more manageable number, we conducted principal components analyses—a data reduction technique (see Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999)—with varimax rotation on the managers’ responses. Given our sample size, we conducted our initial analyses separately for each motive in order to stay close to the recommended sample size-to-item ratio of 5:1 suggested by Gorsuch (1983). Because our goal was to assess these five motives daily in an experience-sampling study (see “Main study”), we wanted to keep the scales as brief as possible while also maintaining high reliability. Thus, for each motive, we retained items that (a) had high loadings (i.e., $> .70$), (b) did not cross-load substantially on any other factors extracted, and (c) captured conceptually similar content in terms of the definition of each motive. This resulted in six items for *effecting compliance* ($\alpha = .94$), six items for *identity maintenance* ($\alpha = .95$), five items for *establishing fairness* ($\alpha = .91$), three items for *positive affect* ($\alpha = .95$), and three items for *negative affect* ($\alpha = .96$).¹

¹ Because principal components analysis with varimax rotation assumes no measurement error and produces uncorrelated factors, following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer we also conducted an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring and promax rotation, which does not make such stringent assumptions. This analysis supported the conclusions reached on the basis of the principal components analysis.

We then conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the 23 retained items to provide a preliminary test of the proposed five-factor structure. We entered the covariance matrix of the items into LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996). Fit statistics for the five-factor model were χ^2 ($df = 220$, $n = 82$) = 370.92, $p < .01$, comparative fit index (CFI) = .96, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .056. As judged by chi-square difference tests, the hypothesized five-factor model fit the data significantly better than alternative, nested models, including a baseline, one-factor model (χ^2_{diff} [$df = 10$, $n = 82$] = 1,189.50, $p < .01$), as well as a four-factor model combining the positive and negative affect items into a single affective factor (χ^2_{diff} [$df = 4$, $n = 82$] = 250.37, $p < .01$). The items, along with their standardized factor loadings from the five-factor model, are supplied in Table 1.

MAIN STUDY

Sample and Procedure

Data for this study was obtained from 90 managers located in three different organizations—34 participants from a health insurance company, 38 from a nonprofit organization, and 18 from a retailer—to increase generalizability. Across the organizations, the average age of the sample was 43 years old ($SD = 10.6$). The majority of respondents were female (57%) and had worked in their current position for six years ($SD = 5$).

Participants were recruited via an e-mail letter that described the study and requested their voluntary participation. Managers interested in participating first reviewed an informed consent before completing an online survey assessing perceptions of discretion over distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal dimensions of justice. In order to capture day-to-day variation in justice rule adherence and motives, we used experience-sampling methodology, whereby managers were asked to complete an online survey near the end of their workday for a three-week period, resulting in 15 possible daily surveys per manager. Our daily, experience-sampling approach allowed us to better capture potential affective motivations for justice rule adherence, which are likely to be more fleeting and ephemeral (e.g., Watson, 2000), and it also allowed us to model within-manager changes in motives and justice rule adherence while effectively controlling for potential between-manager

TABLE 1
Items and Factor Loadings of Motives for Justice Rule Adherence (Pilot Study)^a

Measurement Items	Factor Loading
<i>Effecting compliance^b</i>	
Comply with your wishes	.88
Fulfill your requests	.90
Obey your orders	.87
Behave in the ways that you want him/her to at work	.80
Act in accordance with your preferences	.86
Carry out his/her job as you would want him/her to	.81
<i>Identity maintenance^b</i>	
Think of you as a good leader	.91
Know that you are a capable leader	.87
See you as an effective manager	.87
Consider you a competent leader	.87
Have a positive impression of you as a leader	.89
Have a positive attitude about you	.83
<i>Establishing fairness^b</i>	
See the world as a just place	.81
View the job environment as a place where justice prevails over injustice	.86
Know that you are concerned that people get what they deserve	.79
View the workplace as characterized by truth and righteousness	.89
Realize that people get what they deserve	.80
<i>Positive affect^c</i>	
Because you were happy	.89
Because you were pleased	.93
Because you were delighted	.96
<i>Negative affect^c</i>	
Because you were angry	.94
Because you were frustrated	.93
Because you were irritated	.95

^a Standardized factor loadings are reported; all were statistically significant ($p < .01$); $n = 82$.

^b Items for effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness were framed as: "To what extent did you engage in this behavior in order to ensure that your employee would . . . ?"

^c Items for positive affect and negative affect were framed as: "To what extent did you engage in this behavior . . . ?"

confounds (e.g., trait negative affectivity, social desirability, etc.). Managers who participated in the study were compensated \$74.

In the daily survey, managers were first asked about distributive actions in which they may have engaged that day. Specifically, we asked managers to "consider the outcomes that you may have allocated today to your subordinates, such as pay, promotions, recognition, and transfers," and then—using a "yes or no" format—whether they had

allocated any such outcomes that day to one or more of their subordinates. Managers who responded “no” were taken to questions about procedural actions (and so forth), while managers who responded “yes” were asked to consider the most recent instance in which that action (allocating an outcome to a subordinate) occurred, and then to report on their distributive justice rule adherence and the five hypothesized motives. We repeated this structure—asking managers whether they had engaged in a given justice-relevant action, having them report on their rule adherence for the most recent action, and then assessing the five hypothesized motives—for procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice. For procedural justice, managers were asked to “consider the procedures that you may have used today to make decisions affecting your subordinates,” and then whether they had made any decisions that day that may have affected one or more of their subordinates. As discussed earlier, we adopted a more contemporary view of informational and interpersonal justice by not confining these forms of fairness to specific decision-making contexts, and instead asking about information sharing and interpersonal actions in general (e.g., Bies, 2005). Thus, for informational justice, managers were asked to “consider the information that you may have shared today with one or more of your subordinates,” and then whether they had shared any information that day with one or more of their subordinates. For interpersonal justice, managers were asked to “consider the ways you may have treated your subordinates today during interactions,” and then whether they had interacted that day with one or more of their subordinates. As a result of this design, on a given day, a manager could have reported that he or she had engaged in any combination of justice-relevant actions, ranging from no actions to all four actions (i.e., distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal), with rule adherence and motives assessed for each action separately.

As noted earlier (see “Pilot study”), we relied on self-reports to assess managers’ motives for justice rule adherence. We asked managers to consider their most recent justice-relevant actions (as opposed to asking managers to consider their entire day) for three reasons. First, “the ability to recall contextual details . . . declines quickly with the passage of time” (Robinson & Clore, 2002: 935). Second, asking individuals about recent and specific information improves the accuracy of introspective reports by reducing retrospective recall

biases (see Robinson & Clore, 2002). Third, having managers report on their most recent instance for a given justice dimension not only avoided problems associated with aggregating across potentially diverse instances (e.g., two distributive instances that varied in their degree of rule adherence), but also reduced the possibility that managers would choose only those actions in which they perceived that they had treated a subordinate fairly. In all, 90 managers completed a total of 960 daily surveys out of a possible 1,350, resulting in a daily response rate of 71.1%.

Measures

Justice rule adherence. Each day, managers indicated whether they had allocated an outcome to a subordinate, made a decision affecting a subordinate, shared information with a subordinate, or interacted with a subordinate, and managers who responded in the affirmative were then asked about their justice rule adherence. Drawing from the scales of Colquitt (2001), we constructed single-item measures of adherence to distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice. For distributive justice rule adherence, managers were asked: “To what extent were those outcomes justified based on your subordinate’s effort and contribution?” For procedural justice rule adherence, managers were asked: “To what extent was your subordinate able to express his/her views and feelings?” For informational justice rule adherence, managers were asked: “To what extent was the information you shared with your subordinate candid, thorough, and timely?” For interpersonal justice rule adherence, managers were asked: “To what extent did you treat your subordinate with dignity, respect, and politeness?” All responses were made on a five-point scale (1 = *to a very little extent* and 5 = *to a very large extent*).

Motives for justice rule adherence. For each type of justice, we assessed managers’ motives using the items developed and tested in our pilot study (see Table 1). Managers indicated the extent to which each item described the reason for their behavior using a five-point scale (1 = *to a very little extent* and 5 = *to a very large extent*). Coefficient alphas for each motive, averaged across the four justice types, were as follows: effecting compliance ($\alpha = .95$), identity maintenance ($\alpha = .97$), establishing fairness ($\alpha = .95$), positive affect ($\alpha = .95$), and negative affect ($\alpha = .89$).

Discretion over justice-relevant actions. We assessed managers' perceptions of discretion by asking them in the one-time survey to indicate the extent to which they have freedom over each type of justice, using a five-point scale (1 = *to a very little extent* and 5 = *to a very large extent*). Items were developed by drawing on definitions of the four dimensions of justice, as well as existing scales (e.g., Colquitt, 2001). Managers were first asked to:

Consider the extent to which you have discretion, or freedom, over how you manage subordinates. In other words, consider the extent to which your actions are the result of your own choices versus the result of organizational factors such as formal policies and cost constraints.

Next, managers were asked about each type of justice. For distributive justice, managers were asked about the freedom that they have over "the allocation of outcomes or rewards (such as pay, fringe benefits, promotions, and public recognition) to subordinates." For procedural justice, managers were asked about the freedom that they have over "the decision of what procedures to use when making decisions affecting subordinates and the extent of subordinate input in those procedures." For informational justice, managers were asked about the freedom that they have over "the amount of information and truthfulness of information that you share with your subordinates." For interpersonal justice, managers were asked about the freedom that they have over "the degree to which you treat your subordinates with dignity and respect."

Analyses

Given the nested nature of our data (e.g., days, nested in managers, nested in organizations), we utilized hierarchical linear modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to test our hypotheses. A three-level model revealed that the percentage of variance between organizations in managers' adherence to distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice was nonsignificant and trivial (less than 0.01%). Consequently, we proceeded to a more parsimonious two-level model, with days nested in managers: At level 1 were the repeated, daily observations of managers' engagement in justice-relevant actions, justice rule adherence, and motives for rule adherence; at level 2 were the one-time observations of managers' perceptions of discretion over the four justice dimensions.

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the motives associated with justice rule adherence, we utilized hierarchical linear modeling with random coefficient models whereby each justice dimension (e.g., interpersonal justice rule adherence) was regressed on managers' reports of the five proposed motives for that justice dimension (e.g., effecting compliance, identity maintenance, establishing fairness, positive affect, and negative affect motives for interpersonal justice rule adherence). To test Hypothesis 3 on managerial discretion, we conducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance to provide an omnibus test of the hypothesized linear trend, and we then examined all possible paired contrasts in means between managers' perceptions of discretion over distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice. Finally, to test Hypothesis 4 on the relative validities of cognitive and affective motives, we conducted a dominance analysis (see Azen & Budescu, 2003) by comparing the amount of variance explained in justice rule adherence by the affective motives over and above the cognitive motives, and vice versa, for each type of justice. We controlled at level 1 the time of day at which the daily survey was completed, as well as the day of week, to account for potential circadian rhythm effects (e.g., Watson, 2000).

Following the recommendations of Hofmann, Griffin, and Gavin (2000), all level 1 predictors were centered at individuals' means. This form of centering removes all between-individual variance from the predictors, thus testing our relationships of interest solely at the within-individual level. Consequently, individual differences that could potentially impact responses, such as trait affectivity, social desirability, and demographics, are effectively controlled, and our results show whether justice rule adherence (e.g., treating a subordinate with dignity and respect) for a given manager is higher or lower on days in which the proposed motives (e.g., positive affect) are higher or lower than average for that manager.

RESULTS

Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Before testing our hypotheses, we conducted within-individual confirmatory factor analyses on the motive items shown in Table 1. These analyses were performed in LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996), with the covariance matrix of the items computed after centering scores relative to individ-

uals' means. Given the differences in level 1 sample sizes across the four justice dimensions (e.g., managers engaged in distributive actions far less often than in interpersonal actions), we conducted these analyses separately for distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice. However, results were quite similar across the four justice dimensions; thus we describe them in what follows en masse for the sake of brevity.

For each justice dimension, the hypothesized five-factor model treating each motive as a separate factor provided acceptable fit to the data. For distributive justice motives, χ^2 ($df = 220, n = 306$) = 773.82, $p < .01$, CFI = .93, SRMR = .054; for procedural justice motives, χ^2 ($df = 398, n = 398$) = 716.44, $p < .01$, CFI = .96, SRMR = .039; for informational justice motives, χ^2 ($df = 555, n = 306$) = 941.90, $p < .01$, CFI = .96, SRMR = .039; for interpersonal justice motives, χ^2 ($df = 220, n = 714$) = 1276.69, $p < .01$, CFI = .95, SRMR = .037. For each justice dimension (distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal, respectively), all 23 factor loadings were statistically significant ($p < .01$), and average standardized factor loadings were as follows: effecting compliance (.77, .77, .80, and .81), identity maintenance (.84, .82, .87, and .86), establishing fairness (.79, .78, .82, and .84), positive affect (.83, .85, .85, and .84), and negative affect (.90, .88, .89, and .85). Overall, these results provide additional evidence for the construct validity of the motive scales.

Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Partitioning of Variance

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among the focal variables of interest. Again, owing to variations in sample sizes resulting from differences in the extent to which managers engaged in a given type of justice across the three-week period, we computed a separate correlation matrix for each justice dimension.

To partition the total variance in each criterion (e.g., distributive justice rule adherence) into within- and between-individual components, we estimated null models in hierarchical linear modeling. Results of those models revealed that 80.0%, 79.1%, 74.0%, and 67.8% of the variance in distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice rule adherence, respectively, existed within managers. These results suggest that justice rule adherence may indeed be more a *within-manager* phenomenon than a *between-manager* phe-

nomenon, which is a possibility not acknowledged by prior work taking a proactive approach to justice. The substantial within-manager variation also suggests that managers realize that they do not always follow rules of justice, with their adherence to justice rules varying from one day to the next.

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 predicted that managers are more likely to adhere to rules of justice (distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal) when they are motivated to (a) effect compliance in subordinates, (b) create and maintain a desired identity, and/or (c) establish a sense of fairness. Hypothesis 2 predicted that managers are more likely to adhere to rules of justice when they experience (a) high positive affect and/or (b) low negative affect. Table 3 shows the results of the hierarchical linear modeling regressions testing Hypotheses 1 and 2.²

Table 3 shows that managers were more likely to adhere to distributive rules of justice when they wanted to effect compliance in a subordinate ($B = .38, p < .05$) and when they experienced lower negative affect ($B = -.13, p < .05$). Unexpectedly, managers were *less* likely to adhere to distributive rules of justice when they were concerned about their own identity as a competent and effective leader ($B = -.23, p < .05$). Neither motives to establish fairness ($B = .03$) nor positive affect ($B = .06$) were associated with distributive justice rule adherence.

Table 3 shows that managers were more likely to adhere to procedural rules of justice when (a) they wanted to effect compliance in a subordinate ($B = .20, p < .05$), (b) they were concerned about their social identity ($B = .25, p < .05$), (c) they experienced higher positive affect ($B = .13, p < .05$), and (d) they experienced lower negative affect ($B = -.25, p < .05$). As with distributive justice rule adherence, a motive for establishing fairness had no relationship with managers' procedural justice rule adherence ($B = .02$).

Table 3 shows that managers were more likely to adhere to informational rules of justice when they were motivated to effect compliance in a subordinate ($B = .09, p < .05$) and when they were moti-

² To simplify our presentation, we do not list control variables (*time of day* and *day of week*) in the table; however, they are available from the first author upon request.

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of and Correlations between Variables^a

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	
<i>Distributive justice^b</i>									
1. Rule adherence	4.17	.91	—						
2. Perceptions of discretion	2.70	1.18	-.02	—					
3. Effecting compliance	3.16	1.20	.25*	-.11	—				
4. Identity maintenance	3.10	1.24	.03	-.27	.37*	—			
5. Establishing fairness	2.57	1.18	.09	-.13	.07	.24*	—		
6. Positive affect	2.41	1.34	.22*	.01	.17*	.19*	.18*	—	
7. Negative affect	1.33	.74	-.21*	.01	-.12	-.19*	-.07	-.23*	—
<i>Procedural justice^c</i>									
1. Rule adherence	3.88	1.08	—						
2. Perceptions of discretion	3.29	.99	.05	—					
3. Effecting compliance	3.07	1.18	.22*	-.26	—				
4. Identity maintenance	2.90	1.24	.30*	-.30*	.34*	—			
5. Establishing fairness	2.26	1.13	.12	-.10	.22*	.28*	—		
6. Positive affect	1.96	1.23	.16*	-.01	.14*	.14*	.13*	—	
7. Negative affect	1.33	.73	-.21*	-.07	.11	-.09	.14	-.18*	—
<i>Informational justice^d</i>									
1. Rule adherence	4.34	.68	—						
2. Perceptions of discretion	4.23	.75	.14	—					
3. Effecting compliance	3.10	1.22	.16*	-.25	—				
4. Identity maintenance	2.99	1.25	.09	.01	.45*	—			
5. Establishing fairness	2.30	1.18	.08	-.10	.23*	.39*	—		
6. Positive affect	2.01	1.25	-.03	-.03	.20*	.30*	.30*	—	
7. Negative affect	1.28	.70	.08	-.02	.04	-.03	.03	-.22*	—
<i>Interpersonal justice^e</i>									
1. Rule adherence	4.62	.58	—						
2. Perceptions of discretion	4.74	.59	.18	—					
3. Effecting compliance	2.96	1.28	.07	-.26*	—				
4. Identity maintenance	2.96	1.28	.16*	-.16	.48*	—			
5. Establishing fairness	2.30	1.22	.08	-.04	.27*	.34*	—		
6. Positive affect	2.12	1.26	.10*	-.14	.14*	.26*	.28*	—	
7. Negative affect	1.26	.65	-.14*	-.13*	.08	-.03	.09	-.14*	—

^a Perceptions of discretion are at level 2, all other variables are at level 1.

^b For distributive justice, level 1 $n = 309$, level 2 $n = 77$.

^c For procedural justice, level 1 $n = 406$, level 2 $n = 79$.

^d For informational justice, level 1 $n = 570$, level 2 $n = 84$.

^e For interpersonal justice, level 1 $n = 731$, level 2 $n = 88$.

* $p < .05$

vated to establish a sense of fairness ($B = .07$, $p < .05$). Unexpectedly, managers were *more* likely to adhere to informational rules of justice when they experienced higher negative affect ($B = .10$, $p < .05$), suggesting that managers tended to share information and provide justifications when they were in a poor mood. Neither motives for identity maintenance ($B = .08$) nor positive affect ($B = -.04$) were associated with informational justice rule adherence.

Finally, Table 3 shows that that managers were more likely to adhere to interpersonal rules of justice when (a) they were concerned about their social identity ($B = .08$, $p < .05$), (b) they experienced higher positive affect ($B = .05$, $p < .05$), and

(c) they experienced lower negative affect ($B = -.12$, $p < .05$). In contrast, neither motives to effect compliance in subordinates ($B = .02$) nor to establish fairness ($B = .01$) were associated with interpersonal justice rule adherence. In sum, the results in Table 4 provide partial support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating that both cognitive and affective motives were associated with each form of justice rule adherence.³

³ Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we reanalyzed our data controlling for the mean of each motive at level 2. All of our findings remained identical in terms of significance, with one exception: The within-

TABLE 3
Hierarchical Linear Models Testing Managerial Motives for Justice Rule Adherence^a

Predictor	Distributive Justice Rule Adherence ^b			Procedural Justice Rule Adherence ^c			Informational Justice Rule Adherence ^d			Interpersonal Justice Rule Adherence ^e		
	<i>B</i> ^f	<i>SE</i>	<i>T-value</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>T-value</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>T-value</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>T-value</i>
Intercept	4.15	.07	61.03*	3.89	.08	51.60*	4.33	.05	90.64*	4.62	.04	111.70*
<i>Cognitive motives</i>												
Effecting compliance	.38	.08	4.70*	.20	.07	2.87*	.09	.04	2.05*	.02	.03	.72
Identity maintenance	-.23	.10	-2.35*	.25	.09	2.79*	.08	.05	1.57	.08	.03	3.42*
Establishing fairness	.03	.05	.72	.02	.10	.17	.07	.03	2.48*	.01	.02	.32
<i>Affective motives</i>												
Positive affect	.06	.06	1.11	.13	.06	2.11*	-.04	.04	-1.00	.05	.02	2.02*
Negative affect	-.13	.05	-2.57*	-.25	.06	-3.95*	.10	.05	2.07*	-.12	.05	-2.37*

^a Results control for time of day at which daily survey was completed, as well as day of the week. All level 1 predictors were centered at individuals' means.

^b For distributive justice, level 1 $n = 309$, level 2 $n = 77$.

^c For procedural justice, level 1 $n = 406$, level 2 $n = 79$.

^d For informational justice, level 1 $n = 570$, level 2 $n = 84$.

^e For interpersonal justice, level 1 $n = 731$, level 2 $n = 88$.

^f *B* = Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained in hierarchical linear modeling.

* $p < .05$

Hypothesis 3 proposed that managerial perceptions of discretion over justice-relevant actions increase as one moves from distributive to procedural to informational to interpersonal justice. A repeated-measures analysis of variance revealed a significant linear trend among the discretion means ($F = 157.86$, $p < .05$), with discretion increasing from distributive to procedural to informational to interpersonal justice. The discretion means, shown in Table 2, indicate that managers perceive that they have the least amount of discretion over distributive justice ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 1.18$), with slightly more discretion over procedural justice ($M = 3.29$, $SD = .99$), followed by a greater amount of discretion over informational justice ($M = 4.23$, $SD = .75$), and finally, the most discretion over interpersonal justice ($M = 4.74$, $SD = .59$). Paired-samples t -tests revealed that all six paired comparisons were significant ($p < .01$), supporting Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that as one moves from distributive to procedural to informational to interpersonal rules of justice, cognitive motives explain less variance in justice rule adherence, while affective motives explain more variance in justice rule adherence. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a dominance analysis and obtained the average in-

crease in R^2 for the two motive categories (cognitive and affective) across the two possible models (i.e., cognitive motives first, followed by affective motives, and vice versa). We then rescaled each dominance statistic by dividing it by the total variance explained in the outcome, in order to show the percentage of predictable criterion variance explained by each motive category. As Azen and Budescu (2003) noted, if a focal predictor (or set of predictors) on average explains more variance in an outcome when considered by itself or with a subset of the other predictors, then that focal predictor is regarded as dominant (i.e., more important) relative to others.

The dominance analysis results, shown in Table 4, reveal that the cognitive motives accounted for 77.6%, 71.7%, 57.0%, and 35.9% of the predictable criterion variance of managers' distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice rule adherence, respectively. In contrast, the affective motives accounted for 22.4%, 28.3%, 43.0%, and 64.1% of the predictable criterion variance of managers' distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice rule adherence, respectively. These results support Hypothesis 4 by showing that cognitive motives become less important predictors of justice rule adherence, while affective motives become more important predictors of justice rule adherence, for justice dimensions over which managers have more control, to the point at which affective mo-

manager relationship between positive affect and interpersonal justice rule adherence dropped from a p -value of 0.047 to a p -value of 0.051.

TABLE 4
Dominance Analysis Results for Cognitive versus Affective Motives for Justice Rule Adherence^a

Predictor Category	Average % of Predictable Criterion Variance Explained			
	Distributive Justice Rule Adherence	Procedural Justice Rule Adherence	Informational Justice Rule Adherence	Interpersonal Justice Rule Adherence
Cognitive motives	77.6%	71.7%	57.0%	35.9%
Affective motives	22.4%	28.3%	43.0%	64.1%

^a Predictable criterion variance explained was computed by dividing the dominance statistic for each predictor category (i.e., the average increase in R^2 across the two subset regression models) by the total variance in the outcome explained by the predictors over and above the controls (time of day and day of week). Columns sum to 100%.

tives dominate cognitive motives for the justice dimension with the highest discretion (i.e., interpersonal justice).

Supplemental Analyses

To shed further light on the relative importance of each motive within and across the four justice dimensions, we conducted a full dominance analysis. Specifically, for each motive, we obtained the average amount of incremental variance explained (i.e., the average squared semipartial correlation) across all possible subset models. Thus, taking the motive *effecting compliance* as an example, we obtained the squared semipartial correlation coefficient for effecting compliance added to models containing (a) only the control variables (time of day and day of week), (b) the control variables plus one other motive, (c) the control variables plus two other motives, (d) the control variables plus three other motives, and (e) the control variables plus the other four motives. As noted by Azen and Budescu (2003), this method as-

sesses a given predictor's average dominance, or average importance.

Table 5 shows the dominance analysis results for each motive. As shown in the table, effecting compliance was the dominant predictor of distributive justice rule adherence, explaining (on average) 18.3% incremental variance in the outcome. Identity maintenance (average $\Delta R^2 = 11.6\%$), followed closely by effecting compliance (average $\Delta R^2 = 8.1\%$), was the dominant predictor of procedural justice rule adherence. For informational justice rule adherence, no dominant predictor clearly emerged. For interpersonal justice rule adherence, negative affect was the dominant predictor (average $\Delta R^2 = 9.6\%$). Across all of the justice dimensions, effecting compliance (average $\Delta R^2 = 8.2\%$) and identity maintenance (average $\Delta R^2 = 7.8\%$) were the most dominant predictors, with positive affect (average $\Delta R^2 = 4.8\%$) and negative affect (average $\Delta R^2 = 4.6\%$) being similarly important. Interestingly, establishing fairness was generally unimportant in motivating justice rule adherence (average $\Delta R^2 = 2.5\%$).

TABLE 5
Dominance Analysis Results for Individual Motives for Justice Rule Adherence^a

Predictor	Average Amount of Unique Variance Explained by Predictor				
	Distributive Justice Rule Adherence	Procedural Justice Rule Adherence	Informational Justice Rule Adherence	Interpersonal Justice Rule Adherence	Average across Justice Dimensions
<i>Cognitive motives</i>					
Effecting compliance	18.3%	8.1%	4.2%	2.3%	8.2%
Identity maintenance	9.2%	11.6%	5.1%	5.1%	7.8%
Establishing fairness	2.7%	5.8%	1.0%	0.4%	2.5%
<i>Affective motives</i>					
Positive affect	8.0%	5.3%	4.3%	1.6%	4.8%
Negative affect	2.3%	3.3%	3.2%	9.6%	4.6%

^a Numbers represent average amount of unique variance explained by a given predictor over and above control variables (time of day and day of week) and other predictors in all possible subset models containing one, two, three, and four other predictors.

DISCUSSION

Responding to recent calls in the justice literature to take a more proactive approach to the study of fairness (Colquitt, 2012) and using the actor-focused model of Scott et al. (2009) as an overarching theoretical framework, our daily, experience-sampling study revealed that managers adhere to justice for both “hot” affective reasons and “cold” cognitive reasons. Moreover, there is an interplay between the dimensions of justice and the relative importance of hot versus cold motives, such that daily adherence to justice dimensions affording managers greater latitude (i.e., interpersonal) is associated more with “hot,” impulsive motives, while daily adherence to justice dimensions affording managers less latitude (i.e., distributive) is associated more with “cold,” calculated motives. Broadly, these findings extend theory and research on organizational justice by illuminating the “psychology of the actor” (see Dion, 2003).

Theoretical Implications

As noted at the outset, the few existing studies taking a proactive approach by examining managerial factors as antecedents of justice rule adherence have focused on explaining between-manager variation, addressing the question as to whether some managers are “fairer” than others. Although this is a worthwhile pursuit, our findings that the vast majority (between 68% and 80%) of the variance in justice rule adherence was *within* managers suggests that it may be more constructive to consider fair treatment as more of an episodic phenomenon for a given manager rather than a stable factor differentiating one manager from another. Consequently, the answer to why managers adhere to rather than violate rules of justice may lie more in identifying a manager’s transitory motives than it does in more stable factors such as personality traits or structure.

Our results revealed that the actor-focused model’s proposed cognitive and affective motives provide a nice starting point for explaining differences in a given manager’s justice rule adherence from one episode to the next. For each type of justice, there was at least one significant cognitive motive and at least one significant affective motive associated with whether a justice rule was adhered to or violated at a given point in time. In terms of predictive power, managerial motives related to negative affect had the most widespread influence, im-

acting justice rule adherence across all four justice dimensions—a finding in line with research on the negativity bias (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). The cognitive motives of effecting compliance and identity maintenance were the next most widespread, each affecting three of the four dimensions of justice. Positive affect was associated with only two dimensions of justice.

Ironically, the least influential motive (influencing only informational justice rule adherence) was establishing fairness. The relative unimportance of this motive suggests that managers adhere to rules of justice more for selfish, instrumental reasons than for reasons unto themselves. On this point, Lerner (2003: 393) noted: “[P]eople know and can behave according to normative rules of fairness. However, that can and often does happen in the service of motives other than justice.” Our supplemental dominance analyses supported this notion, showing that motives for effecting compliance and identity maintenance, both of which are instrumental, on average explained the most unique variance in justice rule adherence across the four types of justice. These findings support the view of managers as boundedly rational actors (March & Simon, 1958), and they also fit well with the reactive justice literature, which argues that justice is valued by employees because it serves as a means to some other end (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

Although, typically, we observed that managers adhere to justice rules more when they experience less negative affect, in one case—informational justice—adherence was associated with increased negative affect. It may be that when key decisions create burdens or inconveniences for employees, managers may experience frustration and irritation at being placed in the role of the “bearer of bad news.” In such instances, managers may realize that they will have to craft explanations carefully and provide thorough explanations for why the negative events are occurring, which would explain the positive relationship between managerial experience of negative affect and informational justice rule adherence.

Also surprising was the finding that a manager’s motive to be seen as an effective and capable leader was associated with less distributive justice rule adherence. Some research suggests that people who violate norms for prosocial (rather than selfish) reasons are viewed by others as being more powerful than those who obey norms and rules (Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Blaker, & Heerdink, 2012).

Perhaps managers who do not adhere to distributive justice rules do so in part because they realize that it is a way in which to demonstrate that they are powerful leaders. Thus a manager who gives an employee a larger bonus than rules would otherwise dictate might receive the benefit of enhanced status in the eyes of his or her subordinates.

In addition to revealing why a manager adheres to rules of justice at some times more than others, by integrating the actor-focused model's proposed motives with its proposed differences in managerial discretion over the four justice dimensions, our study illuminated the conditions under which a given motive was more or less strongly associated with rule adherence. The findings regarding discretion received considerable support, as managers' perceptions of the level of discretion that they had over the justice dimensions increased in an ordered progression from distributive to procedural to informational to interpersonal justice. More importantly, cognitive motives were more strongly associated with low-discretion forms of justice, while affective motives were more strongly associated with high-discretion forms of justice. These findings enhance the precision of the model and extend it in a valuable way by showing that the predictive validity of managers' motives depends on the type of justice involved.

It should be noted that although the amount of variance in justice rule adherence explained by cognitive motives diminished with higher-discretion forms of justice, an inspection of the means in Table 2 reveals that those motives were the most frequently reported reasons for managers' actions across all four types of justice—regardless of whether those actions complied with a justice rule or not. In contrast, affective motives (in particular, negative affect) were relatively infrequent, yet they dominated cognitive motives in the prediction of high-discretion forms of justice (i.e., interpersonal justice). At first glance, these findings may seem contradictory. However, the emotions literature has consistently shown that although negative states occur infrequently (Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985), when they do—and when their expression is not constrained—their impact on behavior is significant (Baumeister et al., 2001). Thus although managers may possess cognitive motives more frequently across all types of justice-relevant action, when they are free to express their intentions those more rational motives may be pushed aside should affective motives also be present.

In addition to the implications for the actor-focused model, we see our findings as having implications for other theories relevant to the justice literature. For example, fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998) suggests that employees engage in counterfactual thinking to determine the fairness of a given event, assessing whether circumstances “could,” “should,” and “would” have differed. The differences in discretion imply that low-discretion forms of justice, such as distributive and procedural, may be less susceptible to the “could” counterfactual—the belief that events could have played out differently—because the supervisor has little influence over the outcome or procedure. Indeed, Folger and Cropanzano (1998: 188) noted that the “should” counterfactual is a “key basis for linking people's discretionary conduct with the consequences of that conduct.” In addition, our results have implications for theory on justifications and excuses (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003): Specifically, managers may find violations of interpersonal justice the easiest to excuse if they can point to an extenuating emotional circumstance that elicited impulsive action.

Limitations and Strengths

Although our research possesses several strengths, such as the use of a three-week experience-sampling field study and the development of measures assessing motives for justice rule adherence that can be used in subsequent research, there are several limitations that should be noted. First, given our purpose and the nature of the variables that we examined, we relied on managers' self-reports. Although the manager is arguably the best person to report on such variables (Scott et al., 2009), collecting measures in close proximity each day from the same source naturally raises concerns about common method variance. Several points are worth noting here. First, state affectivity, which can be a source of common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), was modeled as a substantive variable. In addition, by removing between-individual variance in the level 1 predictors, the use of individual-mean centering effectively controlled for several other sources of common method bias, including the common rater effects of social desirability, acquiescence biases, and trait positive or negative affectivity (for further discussion of these and other sources, see Podsakoff et al., 2003). Although response sets (e.g., some managers consistently rating items a “3” on a five-point scale,

other managers a “4,” and so forth) would be a concern in a cross-sectional, between-person design, they are less of a concern in our longitudinal, within-person design. This is because our focus was on how a given manager varied in his or her justice rule adherence and motives from day to day, and if such response sets were strongly operating, the amount of variance within managers in the variables examined would have been restricted—although note that this would not be the case in a cross-sectional design, in which such response sets could create substantial (albeit artificial) variance between managers. Yet we observed that the vast majority (between 67.8% and 80.0%) of the variance in justice rule adherence existed within managers.

That variance also helps to assuage concerns arising from the relatively high means for justice rule adherence shown in Table 2. By relying on managers’ self-reports, one could argue that those reports would be upwardly biased. Although our results indicate that such a concern has merit, it is important to note that we still found significant results in spite of range restriction in our outcomes, which is likely a result of the substantial within-manager variance that we observed. These points notwithstanding, our design could not eliminate all sources of common method bias, such as demand effects or implicit theories. However, these factors (as well as common method bias in general) are unlikely to explain our findings on managerial discretion, as well as our findings that cognitive (affective) motives were more important for justice dimensions over which managers have less (greater) discretion.

In addition, recall that we asked managers each day to consider the most recent instance in which they had engaged in a given type of justice. By using this approach, it might be argued that we missed out on potentially important events, especially for dimensions of justice that may have occurred multiple times on a given day (e.g., interpersonal justice). As we discussed above, however, we followed the advice of Locke and Latham (2004) to utilize introspective reports in order to glean insight into managers’ motives for their actions, and such reports are more accurate when the information assessed is recent (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Moreover, asking about a specific event (rather than asking about the manager’s entire day) helped to avoid problems associated with aggregating across potentially disparate events. That being said, future research should utilize other methods to determine the extent to which our findings generalize—e.g.,

researchers could ask managers to recall instances in which they especially adhered to or violated each type of justice. But while such a strategy might increase variance in measures of justice rule adherence, it runs the risk of priming managers and introducing demand characteristics.

Finally, although we found that managers do in fact perceive differences in the amount of discretion that they have over the four justice dimensions, as predicted by the actor-focused model, we were unable to explain precisely *why* they perceive these differences. As discussed above, the model proposes that the four justice dimensions differ in terms of how systemic they are, how collectively observable they are, whether they are exchange-based or encounter-based, and their cost (Scott et al., 2009). Given the demands of our experience-sampling design, it was beyond the scope of our investigation to assess these specific factors. However, our findings that managers from three different organizations did, in fact, perceive the hypothesized differences in discretion could serve as a springboard for future research that might extend our findings by identifying which of the above factors are the key drivers of these perceptual differences. For example, it may be that one or two factors, such as the distinction between exchanges and encounters, consistently drives perceived differences in discretion, as well as the differences in motive strength across the justice types observed. It may also be that the relative importance of these factors varies from one situation to the next (e.g., cost is a more important driver of discretion during tough economic times).

Practical Implications and Additional Suggestions for Future Research

As noted at the outset, the practical importance of identifying motives for just actions stems from the idea that if the reasons for managers’ behaviors were to be better understood, then efforts could be devoted to promoting the expression of motives associated with adhering to justice and curbing the expression of motives associated with violating justice. To the extent that justice rule adherence is more of a within-manager phenomenon, attempts to enhance fair treatment via selection based on stable individual differences such as a manager’s personality may have limited utility, and thus organizations may benefit more by focusing efforts on daily motive expression. Given that the motive with the most “bang for the buck” across all of the

justice dimensions appears to be effecting compliance, organizations could encourage their managers to utilize justice rule adherence as a strategy to gain compliance from their employees, as opposed to other strategies that might achieve compliance, yet have detrimental side effects (e.g., coercion).

The interplay of motives and discretion also has important practical implications. Given that the dimensions of justice over which managers have the greatest freedom to influence (informational and—especially—interpersonal) were associated more with affective motives (particularly negative affect), attempts to reduce the frequency of negative affect in managers would be beneficial. Beyond the obvious ways in which to improve mood, such as the delivery of positive feedback (Elfenbein, 2007), it would be advantageous for organizations to train managers in effective strategies to regulate negative moods. Historically, recommendations for emotion regulation have been confined to front-line, customer service employees. However, recent research has begun to consider the importance of emotion regulation to effective leadership (Gardner, Fischer, & Hunt, 2009). Integrating our findings with that nascent literature suggests that “deep acting,” whereby individuals try actively to change a negative mood by strategies such as situation reappraisal and attentional deployment (Gross, 1998), might be beneficial for leaders to practice, not only because the cultivated mood is more authentic (Gardner et al., 2009), but also because, as our results show, justice rule adherence will be more likely. If organizations encourage deep acting, they should also try to ensure that managers’ resources are not overtaxed, because research has shown that emotional regulation becomes impaired under such circumstances (see Strack et al., 2006). Ultimately, focusing efforts on affective motives in order to influence adherence to informational and interpersonal justice may be especially worthwhile because those dimensions (a) afford managers greater discretion, (b) impact on important outcomes such as citizenship and counterproductivity as much, or more, than distributive and procedural justice, and (c) appear, based on our findings, to occur with much greater frequency on a day-to-day basis than distributive and procedural justice, providing more opportunities for adherence.

With respect to future research, our findings could be extended by incorporating employee reactions, thereby bridging proactive and reactive justice research (see Colquitt, 2012). To do so, research could examine the extent to which subordinates are

able to infer their managers’ motives for a given justice-relevant action. Those inferences, as well as any accompanying attributions, may affect how subordinates react to their managers’ justice-relevant actions. For instance, an employee who perceives that a manager’s act of justice was motivated by image-related concerns may react less positively than if the employee perceives that the act was motivated by a desire to establish or restore fairness.

In addition, although our findings suggest that differences in the amount of discretion that the justice dimensions afford to managers shape the relative predictive power of motives when managers actually act on a given dimension, it may be that differences in discretion also create instances in which managers want to act on a given dimension, but cannot. For example, a manager may wish to effect compliance in an employee or to prolong a positive affective state by adhering to distributive justice, but may be unable to do so because of discretion-reducing factors such as cost constraints or the lack of a formal exchange opportunity. In such situations, discretion should reduce the predictive power of all motives in an equal fashion. Indeed, the lower daily frequency of distributive and procedural justice rule adherence that we observed suggests that there may have been times when managers wanted to act on these forms of justice, but could not. To explore this possibility, future research could capture situations in which managers were motivated to act on a given type of justice, but did not.

Finally, future research could attempt to identify other motives that managers possess. Indeed, upon closer inspection, the motives proposed by the actor-focused model are rather internally focused. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, managers may also be motivated by more external factors (e.g., adhering to justice because that is the company’s policy). Integrating this idea with managerial discretion, it could be that such motives are more likely to explain variance in distributive and procedural justice rule adherence given that they are often guided by systemic factors such as policies and protocols (Sheppard et al., 1992).

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Brent A. Scott (scott@broad.msu.edu) is an associate professor of management at the Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University. He received his PhD from the University of Florida. His research interests include mood and emotion in the workplace, organizational justice, and employee well-being.

Donald E. Conlon (conlon@msu.edu) is an Eli Broad Professor of Management at the Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University. He received his PhD in organizational behavior from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His current research focuses on organizational justice, conflict and negotiation, and managerial decision making.

You Jin Kim (ykim@csudh.edu) is an assistant professor of management in the College of Business Administration and Public Policy at California State University-Dominguez Hills. She received her PhD from Michigan State University. Her primary research interests include organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), motives, proactive behavior and emotion in the workplace.

